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September 2009  1 Introduction
The wide international wage di⁄erentials for labor of similar skill and qual-
ity are indicative of the large potential gains that can be enjoyed by the
world economy from an increase in the volume of international migration.
While the host countries recognize the potential bene￿ts, past experience
suggests that immigration does not only involve the import of labor, but a
more complex transaction that can potentially lower the perceived welfare
of the host country. Given the elaborate welfare state that exists in the ad-
vanced countries and various considerations related to the possible negative
externalities from hosting permanent unskilled immigrants, many of them
have shown a strong preference for guest-worker programs. So have the
labor-importing countries of the Middle East and East Asia, which seem to
be more concerned about the long term implications of changes in the ethnic
composition of their population than they are over the ￿scal consequences of
international migration.1 The objective of guest-worker programs in these
economies is to address labor-market shortages, while avoiding, to the extent
possible, the unwanted consequences of permanent immigration of unskilled
workers.
From the perspective of the source countries, there is also a keen interest
in bene￿ting from international migration. One key bene￿t is the ￿ ow of
remittances from emigrants employed abroad. Worker remittances from the
advanced to the developing countries are an important source of income and
capital for millions of households. For all the developing countries combined,
o¢ cially recorded ￿ ows are signi￿cantly in excess of two hundred billion
dollars per year. These transfers a⁄ect not only the direct recipients, but
also other members of the community, as the spending of remittances has
an impact on commodity and factor prices as well as employment opportu-
nities throughout the economy.2 Remittances, however, are more likely to
1Prominent among the countries that recruit temporary foreign workers are the USA,
Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, the Netherlands, Belguim, Ireland,
Austria, Poland, Portugal, Cyprus, Israel, the oil-producing economies of the Middle East
and the rapodly growing East Asian economies such as South Korea, Taiwan (province of
China), Malaysia, and Singapore. For a description of temporary foreign-worker programs
in the major labor-importing countries, see GAO (2006).
2There is a very large literature on remittance ￿ ows and how they a⁄ect the families left
behind and investment in small businesses in the source country. See for example, Adams
2come from temporary migrants who leave their families behind, rather than
from permanent migrants who have weaker ties with the source country.3
From the perspective of the policymakers of both the labor-exporting and
labor-importing countries, the bene￿ts of migration of low-skilled labor are
therefore likely to be higher in a system of temporary rather than permanent
migration [see Djaji· c (2009)].
Within this setting, a number of important questions emerge. From the
point of view of the host country, what are the characteristics of an opti-
mal immigration policy concerning low-skilled, temporary foreign workers?
What is the optimal duration of a work permit? What should the source
country do to maximize its own welfare, given the immigration policies of the
host? How would these policies di⁄er, depending on whether or not both
countries cooperate to maximize joint welfare? The purpose of the present
study is to address these questions within a game-theoretic framework of
analysis. As temporary migration of low-skilled workers is likely to grow in
importance in the decades to come, these and other related issues should be
high on the research agenda. Surprisingly, very little theoretical work has
been conducted so far on these crucial issues.4
(1991), Ammasari (2003), Brauw and Rozelle (2003), Durand et al.(1996), Escobar-Patapi
and Martinez-Castellanos (1991), Lianos (1997), Lucas (1987), Massey and Parrado (1998),
Nega et al.(2004), Penny (1986), Puri and Ritzema (1999), and Woodru⁄ and Zenteno
(2001). See also Djaji· c (1986, 1998), Kirwan and Holden (1986), Quibria (1997), and
Rivera-Batiz (1986), among others, for the analysis of macro e⁄ects.
3See, e.g., Glytsos (1997) and Black (2003). In surveying the evidence on remittance
￿ ows to the developing countries, Lucas (2005) notes the importance of temporary mi-
gration to the Gulf states and East Asia, both in absolute terms and as a fraction of a
migrant￿ s earnings abroad.
4There is a vast literature on policy issues related to migration of skilled workers as
well as illegal immigration of unskilled workers. Concerning legal migration of unskilled
labor, the literature on the choice between labor and capital mobility does address a range
of important policy issues (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983), Calvo and Wellisz (1983),
Jones, Coelho and Easton (1986) and other contributions on this topic). More recently,
Martin (2003) and Ruhs (2002) analyse various guest-worker programs and o⁄er policy
recommendations. Schi⁄ (2007) looks at optimal immigration policy with a focus on the
distinctions between permanent migration, guest-worker migration and Mode IV under the
GATS. Winters et al (2003) discuss issues related to liberalizing Mode IV, while Hatton
(2007) raises the question of whether the potential gains from international migration
could be realized through international cooperation along the lines similar to what the
WTO has done for trade. Jensen et al (2007) examine the implications of immigration-
policy coordination among host countries in a model where immigrants are heterogeneous
3In order to keep the analysis simple and tractable, the focus of our model
is limited to several key aspects of guest-worker migration. One of these
is the problem of ensuring that the guest-workers return to their country
of origin at the moment their work permit expires. It is often the case
that temporary workers wish to convert their status to that of a permanent
immigrant. When lawful possibilities are limited or very costly, it is not
unusual for them to extend their stay as illegal aliens. This is obviously
undesirable from the perspective of the host country, but also from that of
the source country. Permanent migrants are less likely to send remittances or
contribute to growth and development of their country of origin by bringing
back human and physical capital.
Another feature of guest-worker migration that we focus on are the ben-
e￿ts enjoyed by the employers. In the economies of East Asia, such as
South Korea and Taiwan, temporary workers are recruited from abroad and
paid by their employers considerably lower wages than those paid to native
workers.5 Similarly, in the advanced Western economies, the possibility of
hiring a guest worker to perform tasks that native workers are not willing to
undertake at the going wage is a source of large rents. The longer the for-
eign worker remains in the host county, however, the greater is the worker￿ s
awareness of its labor-market opportunities and compensation structures. To
the extent possible, a guest worker can be expected to take advantage of such
opportunities and thereby achieve gradual assimilation in terms of earnings
in relation to native workers. This reduces the rents enjoyed by the employ-
ers, diminishing to some extents the bene￿ts of employing a foreign worker.
In addition, the longer a guest worker stays in the host country, the easier
it is to transit from temporary to permanent status, whether legal or illegal.
This re￿ ects the possibility of acquiring relevant information over time and
developing networks in the host country that can serve to reduce the cost of
status adjustment.
The authorities of the host and source countries can also in￿ uence return-
migration decisions. Very tough enforcement policies of the host can guaran-
with respect to their performance in the labor market.
5According to Stein (2003), native factory workers in Taiwan "...earn between $600
and $850 per month, while their foreign countreparts get the minimum wage of $460.
...In South Korea, which limits foreign laborers to a single three-year visit, workers are
considered trainees their ￿rst two years, so they are exempt from most of the country￿ s
labor laws, including minimum wages and overtime" (pp. 2-3).
4tee that a vast majority of temporary foreign workers do in fact return at the
end of their contract. Tough enforcement measures, however, can absorb a
large amount of public resources as well as tarnish a country￿ s international
reputation in relation to humanitarian and human-rights issues. Cooperation
with the source countries in the form of repatriation agreements, preferential
guest-worker arrangements, and other modes of cooperation (related to visas,
travel documents, border controls, development cooperation, foreign direct
investment, etc.) can also lower the chances that a guest worker would seek
to remain in the host country as an illegal alien. Other measures taken by
a source country can have a similar e⁄ect. Special tax treatment for house-
hold goods and capital brought from abroad can go a long way to encourage
migrants to return. Preferential rates of return on repatriated savings and fa-
vorable exchange rates when foreign currency is converted into local currency
also support return.6 While these measures impose costs on the treasuries
(and hence taxpayers) of the source countries, they can prove to be bene￿cial
in the long run by stimulating development.
Our two-country model, presented in Section 2, tries to capture some of
these features of contemporary guest-worker migration. Its structure is most
relevant for the host countries such as South Korea, Taiwan (province of
China), Singapore, Cyprus, Israel, and GCC States, where the concern over
illegal immigration is relatively high, low-skilled guest workers are recruited
on multi-year contracts from distant (rather than neighbouring) countries,
and are typically paid lower wages than those earned by the native workers.7
6A number of source countries have initiated special programs that provide returnees
rates of interest on savings in excess of those available abroad. For example, India and
Pakistan have pursued a policy of enabling return migrants to deposit their savings into
special foreign currency accounts on which they earn a premium over world ￿nancial
market rates. Puri and Ritzema (1999) report that in 1991, the margin over Eurodollar
deposit rates ranged from .75% to 1.62%, depending on the maturity of the deposit.
Special accounts, exchange rates, ￿scal incentives, and other programs designed to channel
remittances into productive investments and small business activities have also emerged
in Egypt, Jordan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Turkey, and the Philippines [see Nega et al (2004)
and Puri and Ritzema (1999)]. See also de Haas and Plug (2006) for the case of Morocco.
7Our model is less relevant for host countries such as the U.S.A., Canada, and many of
the Western European economies that seem to show less concern over illegal immigration
and where low-skilled guest workers are typically recruited on contracts lasting for less
than a year, with employers obliged to pay the same wage to migrants as they do to native
workers.
5From the perspective of the host country, we focus on one key dimension of a
temporary immigration policy which has not been adequately treated in the
theoretical literature: Namely, the optimal duration of a guest-worker per-
mit. We also examine the implications of that policy for the source country
and the objectives that its authorities may try to achieve. This is followed
in Section 3 by an analysis of the interaction between the migration-policy
instruments of both countries within a game-theoretic framework. A non-
cooperative setting is considered ￿rst, where each country tries to maximize
its own welfare, given the policy of the other. In Section 4, we examine the
possibility of both countries cooperating on migration issues to maximize
joint welfare and compare the policies that emerge with those in the absence
of cooperation. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Analytic Framework
Consider the host country, H, that allows its employers to import foreign
workers temporarily from the source country, S, in order to meet any labor-
market shortages that may tend to push the wage paid to native workers
above some constant level W H. The overriding objective of the host country￿ s
immigration policy is, therefore, to stabilize the wage enjoyed by the native
workers. It achieves this objective by continuously adjusting the number
of temporary work permits issued to foreign labor. This leaves open the
interesting question of how long should any one guest worker be allowed to
stay.
Let us assume for simplicity that temporary immigrants are granted non-
renewable work permits of the duration ￿. As a condition for being granted
a permit, they are required to have a job contract of the same duration from
an eligible local employer that sets the initial wage at the level w0 < W H.
The employer, in turn, incurs the cost C for the privilege of being able to
hire a guest worker. This cost includes travel and recruitment expenses as
well as any other initial costs of participation in the guest-worker program.8
8In countries such as Switzerland, Austria, Cyprus, Singapore, Australia, Netherlands,
6The hiring of low-cost foreign labor generates a rent for an employer. This
implies that there is an excess demand for imports of labor. For simplicity,
we assume that employers are invited to participate in the program after
being chosen at random by the authorities of country H.
As part of their employment contract, migrants are given food and hous-
ing by their employers in addition to the starting wage, w0.9 Let us assume
that the cost of food and housing amounts to K per unit of time and that
the entire cash portion of the migrant￿ s wage is saved and repatriated to the
source country at the point of return.
The Question of Rents
While their initial, guest-worker wage is set by the authorities at w0,
migrants slowly learn about labor-market opportunities in the host country.
They observe that native workers are receiving a considerably higher wage
W H. Over time, therefore, an employer of a guest worker is increasingly
in competition with other employers for the services of his migrant worker
and the implied rent. We shall assume that this enables migrants to obtain
wage increases that bring them closer to the level of earnings of the native
workers10. More speci￿cally, we assume that the money wage received by a
migrant is simply given by
(1) W M = inffw0 + ￿t;W H ￿ Kg
and Germany, employers must pay a fee for the work permits of their foreign workers. See
GAO (2006). Although we do not explicitly account for such fees in this paper, they can
easily be included in the analysis.
9Many of the seasonal guest-worker programs impose the free-housing requirement on
the employers. Examples include Canada￿ s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, UK￿ s
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme, the H-2A program for foreign agricultural workers
in the US, as well as similar programs in Germany, France and Switzerland [see Martin
(2006)].
10See Hillman, Epstein and Weiss (1999) for a more detailed description of a competitive
mechanism that can generate this type of earnings assimilation of guest workers in relation
to the natives. Schi⁄ (2007) makes use of a similar mechanism in his analysis of an
optimal immigration policy. Also note that in some countries, the employment contracts
contain provisions that require the employer to raise the wage paid to the immigrant every
year (e.g., Cyprus) or, in their third (and last) year, as in South Korea. Whether the
guest-worker program does or does not allow a worker to change employers, employment-
switching often occurs, as it did during the Bracero program [see Martin (2006)], allowing
migrants to improve their earnings and working conditions.
7where the constant ￿ > 0 re￿ ects the migrant￿ s rate of earnings assimila-
tion and t represents the amount of time since arrival in the host country. It
follows that for each migrant worker brought into the host country on a work
permit of duration ￿, his employer enjoys a rent amounting to the di⁄erence
between the marginal productivity of labor, which is constant at the level
W H, and the cost of recruiting and transporting (C), housing and feeding
(K), and paying (W M) an immigrant worker. Considering the range of ￿ for




(W H ￿ K ￿ w0 ￿ ￿t)dt ￿ C;
which we assume to be positive in the relevant range of analysis.
For a given employment position that is ￿lled by foreign labor over a
time horizon of the length T, an employer will have a total of T=￿ migrants
if each of them is allowed to work in H on a permit of duration ￿. The total
employer rent, R, per employment position over the interval T is therefore
(3) R = (T=￿)f(W H ￿ K ￿ w0)￿ ￿ ￿￿2=2 ￿ Cg.
Let us suppose that the immigration authorities set ￿ to maximize R.




Thus the lower the ￿xed cost of recruiting and transporting foreign labor
and the higher the rate of earnings assimilation of guest workers, the shorter
the optimal duration of a guest-worker permit if the sole objective of the
immigration authorities is to maximize the rents enjoyed by the employers.
In reality, the authorities are likely to have a number of additional arguments
in their objective function. The following subsection extends the model by
assuming that the authorities are also concerned about the possibility that
some of the guest workers might become illegal immigrants.
The Possibility of Overstaying
8Experience of advanced countries that have had guest-worker programs
in the past, shows that temporary migrants do not always return to their
country of origin when their work permit expires. Some manage to remain
legally in the host country by adjusting their status, while others may stay
without authorization. To keep the analysis simple, let us suppose that there
are no legal options for overstaying and that the welfare of the host country is
negatively a⁄ected when a guest worker remains on its territory as an illegal
alien.11 Since the number of guest workers that rotate in a given employment
position over a time horizon of the length T is T=￿, the stock of illegal aliens,
A, generated per position that is ￿lled by guest workers over that interval is
(5) A = (T=￿)￿(￿);
where ￿(￿) is the probability that any given guest worker will remain in
the host country illegally after the expiration of his work permit. We shall as-
sume that the function ￿(￿) < 1 for all ￿, is continuously twice di⁄erentiable
with ￿0(￿) > 0; ￿00(￿) ? 0, and lim ￿!0 ￿(￿) = 0. This re￿ ects the notion
that guest workers learn over time about the possibilities of successfully re-
maining in the host country as illegal aliens, while simultaneously developing
networks that can help reduce the expected lifetime cost of transiting to ille-
gal alien status. It is therefore more likely that a guest worker stays illegally,
the larger the value of ￿ chosen by the authorities. The second derivative of
￿(￿) is likely to be negative in reality, although we shall also devote some
attention to the case of ￿00(￿) > 0 later in the paper12.
11While many of the advanced countries exhibit a rather permisive attitude with respect
to illegal immigration, this is clearly not the case in the oil-producing countries of the
Middle East, or the rapidly growing East Asian economies. In reference to the guest-
worker programs of the latter, Stein (2003) notes that "...the contracts are meant to be
short term. Once they are ￿nished, importing nations are eager to ensure that the workers
won￿ t ￿nd a way to stay." (p. 3).
12Our analysis focuses on employer rents and illegal immigration generated per employ-
ment position that is ￿lled by guest workers over any given time horizon. Alternatively,
one may wish to consider the consequences of a guest-worker policy designed to meet a
labor-market shortage amounting to N units of unskilled labor over a time horizon of the
length T. The total number of illegal aliens generated is then given by N{1-[1-￿(￿)]T=￿}
and the total undiscounted rents enjoyed by all the employers participating in the pro-
gram are N￿(￿){1-[1-￿(￿)]T=￿}/￿(￿); where ￿ is de￿ned in eq.(2). With the use of this
speci￿cation, the algebra quickly becomes very tedious, without o⁄ering much in terms
9The optimal value of ￿
If in addition to the employer rents we introduce the disutility of hosting
illegal aliens into the objective function, V , of the host country, we obtain a
more general function that the authorities will seek to maximize.
(6) V = R ￿ ￿A = T
￿ [(wH ￿ w0 ￿ K)￿ ￿ ￿￿2
2 ￿ C ￿ ￿￿(￿)];
where the constant ￿ > 0 is the weight attached by the authorities to
the cost of hosting an additional illegal immigrant relative to the bene￿t
of generating an additional unit of employer rents through the guest-worker
program. Maximizing V with respect to ￿ yields
(7) @V
@￿ = 0 ) C ￿ ￿￿2
2 + ￿￿(￿)[1 ￿ ￿￿] = 0
where ￿￿ = (@￿=@￿)(￿=￿) > 0. We shall assume in what follows that
￿￿ is constant. Thus, for the case ￿00(￿) < 0, ￿￿ < 1; while for ￿00(￿) > 0,
￿￿ > 1. Eq. (7) provides an implicit solution for the optimal value of ￿ from
the perspective of country H.13
When ￿￿ = 1, the optimal ￿ is exactly the same as if the authorities were
simply maximizing employer rents (see eq.(4)). In that case, the private ob-
jetives of the employers perfectly coincide with those of the host-country
authorities. For ￿￿ > 1 any increase in ￿ generates a proportionately larger
increase in ￿(￿); which implies that a larger number of illegal aliens is gen-
erated per employment position ￿lled by a guest worker over any given time
horizon.14 Accordingly, when illegal immigration is a problem for the host
country, the immigration authorities have an incentive to reduce the duration
of the work permit if ￿(￿) is elastic with respect to ￿: Alternatively, if ￿￿ < 1;
an increase in ￿ reduces the number of illegal immigrants per employment
of additional insights. We therefore retain our assumption that the authorities of H are
concerned about the employer rents and illegal immigration generated per employment
position ￿lled by a guest worker.
13It can be easily veri￿ed with the aid of eqs.(6) and (7) that the second order condition
is satis￿ed.
14Di⁄erentiating eq. (5) with respect to ￿ we obtain @A=@￿ = ( ￿￿-1)T￿(￿)=￿2. It
follows that the number of illegal aliens, A, generated per employment position ￿lled by a
guest worker increases with ￿ when ￿￿>1 (i.e., ￿ is elastic with respect to ￿) and diminishes
with ￿ when ￿￿<1.
10position over a given time horizon. The optimal ￿ is then larger than its
rent-maximizing value. To be sure that employers keep their migrant work-
ers for the entire period ￿ set by the authorities, we assume that employers
are subject to a penalty that gurantees complience.
The Source-Country Perspective
The source country also has a stake when it comes to temporary migra-
tion. Let us suppose that it is interested in maximizing the ￿ ow of worker
remittances from H. Since we assumed that guest workers repatriate at the
point of return all of their money income earned abroad, the total amount
of repatriated savings per employment position ￿lled by a guest worker in H
over T units of time is given by
(8) F = T
￿ [w0￿ + (￿￿2=2)][1 ￿ ￿(￿)];
where [1￿￿(￿)] is the probability that a guest worker does in fact return
to S with accumulated savings at the moment the work permit expires.
The source country obviously does not have the power to set the duration
￿ of the work permit enjoyed by its citizens in H, but it may have policies
available that enhance the probability of return for any given ￿. To the
extent that such policies come into play, we need to generalize the function
￿(:) to re￿ ect the measures employed by the authorities of S.
As noted in the Introduction, various ￿scal bene￿ts and one-time ad-
vantages, as well as bureaucratic simpli￿cations have been o⁄ered by source
countries to induce emigrants to return with accumulated savings. These
bene￿ts are costly to the taxpayers. Moreover, they are sometimes seen
as contributing to greater income inequality, because they assist returning
migrants who are in many cases relatively better o⁄than the average source-
country resident. On the other hand, to the extent that such programs
attract migrants to come back with their savings, they also attract critically
needed capital (and, in a more general setting, human capital) that has a
positive e⁄ect on job creation, growth and development.
Let us therefore assume that the objective function, V ￿, of the policy-
makers of S has two arguments: The repatriated savings, F, brought back
11by the returning migrants, and the cost of ￿scal and other bene￿ts, B, o⁄ered
to returnees who complete their guest-worker contracts abroad, which has a
negative weight of ￿
￿.
(9) V ￿ = (T=￿)[w0￿ + (￿￿2=2) ￿ ￿
￿B][1 ￿ ￿(￿;B)],
where T=￿ is the total number of migrants per employment position in
H over a time horizon T: Only a fraction 1 ￿ ￿(￿;B) of them will return,
each receiving a package of bene￿ts B, which in addition to ￿, a⁄ect the
probability that a migrant will return to S. One would expect that the e⁄ect
of an increase in B on the probability of return, 1 ￿ ￿(￿;B); to be positive
but diminishing. This implies that ￿B < 0 and ￿BB > 0: In addition, we
continue to assume that ￿￿ > 0 and ￿￿￿ ? 0.
Within our framework of analysis, the policy of H concerning ￿ has an
impact not only on its own welfare, but also on that of country S. Similarly,
return-related policies of S, summarized by B, have an impact on the welfare
of both countries. This is an environment in which there may be scope for
both countries to improve world welfare through international cooperation
on issues related to temporary migration. We begin, however, by character-
izing a non-cooperative equilibrium, where each country sets the level of its
migration-policy instrument to maximize its own welfare, given the policy of
the other country.
3 Nash Equilibrium
Maximization of the objective function, V, of the host country with respect
to ￿ yielded eq.(7). We now rewrite this expression to take into account the
migration policy of the source country and obtain the reaction function of H.
(10) @V




2 + ￿￿(￿;B)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
i
= 0; (RF)
12The partial derivatives of (10) with respect to ￿ and B are given by




















1￿￿ > 0 is assumed to be constant and the arguments
of the function ￿ have been suppressed for notational simplicity.
With the aid of eqs.(6) and (7), it can be easily shown that V￿￿ is unam-
biguously negative regardless of whether ￿￿ is greater or smaller than unity.
This guarantees that the second-order condition for maximization of V with
respect to ￿ is satis￿ed.
Similarly, S will set B at a value that maximizes its objective function (9)
(13) @V ￿


















￿(1 + ￿B) < 0,
where we used (13) to simplify the expression in (14). With V ￿
BB< 0,
the second-order condition for the maximization of V ￿ with respect to B
is satis￿ed. Eqs.(14) and (15) imply that the slope of the reaction func-
tion of S is simply dB
d￿ jV ￿
B=0 = (w0 + ￿￿)￿B=￿
￿(1 + ￿B) > 0. In ￿gures 1a
and 1b, RF* is therefore depicted as a positively sloped schedule, convex














: Since the numerator of
13this expression is negative [see eq. (11)] RF can be either negatively or posi-
tively sloped, depending on whether ￿￿ is smaller or greater than unity. This
is illustrated in ￿gures 1a and 1b, respectively. In the latter case, RF* is
shown to be ￿ atter than RF, as required for stability.
Comparative Statics
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where the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix ￿ = ￿(￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿)￿
￿(1 + ￿B) + (w0 + ￿￿)￿B￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)1￿￿
B ￿B is assumed to be positive, as
required for stability. It can be easily seen that ￿ > 0 for ￿￿ < 1 but it can
also be shown to be positive for ￿￿ > 1, provided that ￿￿ < ￿2(￿￿ + w0 ￿
￿)=￿(￿￿2=2 ￿ C):
From (17) we are able to solve for the e⁄ects of changes in the exogenous
variables, including C, ￿; w0; ￿; and ￿
￿ on the optimal values of migration
policy instruments ￿ and B in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Increase in the cost of recruiting and transporting guest workers
If there is an increase in C, the host country prefers a higher value of ￿
for any given B to economize on the cost of importing labor. This shifts RF
to the right, while leaving RF* una⁄ected in ￿gures 1a and 1b. Thus, an
increase in C results in an unambiguous increase in both ￿ and B in the new
equilibrium. From (17), we obtain
(18) ￿ d￿
dC = ￿
￿(1 + ￿B) > 0;
14(19) ￿dB
dC = (w0 + ￿￿)￿B > 0;
where the increase in the equilibrium value of B re￿ ects the source coun-
try￿ s heightened interest in attracting migrants to return with their accumu-
lated assets, which are greater when country H chooses a larger ￿.
Higher rate of earnings assimilation
An increase in ￿ shifts RF to the left in ￿gures 2a and 2b, as more rapid
earnings assimilation of guest workers calls for a lower ￿ at any given B in
order to protect employer rents in the host country. At the same time the
implied increase in the rate of saving by migrant workers requires that the
authorities of S o⁄er a larger B to returnees for any given ￿. As a result, the
RF* schedule shifts up and to the left. When ￿￿ < 1, it can be shown that
the leftward shift of RF is larger than that of RF*, guaranteeing lower values
of both ￿ and B in the new equilibrium.15 The intuition behind the decline in
B following an increase in ￿ is quite simple. There are two con￿ icting e⁄ects
on B: A direct one that calls for a higher B, as described above, and an
induced one associated with a reduction in ￿. A lower ￿ reduces the amount
of accumulated assets that are repatriated by each of the returnees, making
it optimal for country S to reduce B. In the case of ￿ < 1, the induced e⁄ect
dominates the direct e⁄ect so that B is lower in the new Nash equilibrium.
This is illustrated in ￿gure 2a as a shift from the initial equilibrium at E0

















d￿ = ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿￿￿ + w0]￿2
2 ￿B ? 0; as w0 7 ￿(￿￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿￿￿
15The absolute value of the horizontal shift of the RF schedule in response to an in-






; while that of the FR* amounts to
￿2=2[w0 + ￿￿]: Thus, for ￿￿ < 1 + w0￿
￿￿￿￿; the leftward shift of the RF schedule is larger
than that of RF*. This is equivalent to the condition that w0 > ￿(￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿
￿ ￿￿.
15Alternatively, if ￿￿ > 1, the leftward shift of RF may be either larger or
smaller than that of RF*, depending on whether w0 is larger or smaller than
￿(￿￿ ￿1)￿
￿￿￿ (see footnote 12): It follows that for w0 > ￿(￿￿ ￿1)￿
￿￿￿; both B
and ￿ are once again lower in the new equilibrium, depicted by E1 in ￿gure
2b. For w0 < ￿(￿￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿￿￿; however, the RF* schedule shifts to the left by
more than RF, giving rise to an increase, rather than a decline in B. The
direct e⁄ect on B of an increase in ￿ then dominates the induced e⁄ect of a
reduction in ￿: This is illustrated by a new equilibrium at E2:
Higher initial guest-worker wage
An increase in w0 results in a higher guest-worker saving rate, which
requires S to o⁄er an increase in returnee bene￿ts for any given ￿: This shifts
the RF* schedule up, while the reaction function of H remains una⁄ected.
In consequence, when ￿￿ < 1 the equilibrium value of B increases and
that of ￿ declines. Alternatively, when ￿￿ > 1 (case depicted in ￿gure 1b)
the upward shift of the RF* schedule generates an increase in both B and
￿. The intuition behind the opposite direction of change in ￿ is simple to
grasp. With an increase in B, illegal immigration is reduced for any given ￿;
allowing the host country to pull back on its e⁄orts to combat the problem
of unauthorized overstaying. This calls for a lower ￿ when ￿￿ < 1 and a




B ? 0; as ￿￿ ? 1;
(23) ￿ dB
dw0 = ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿]￿￿B > 0:
showing an unambiguous increase in B, while ￿ increases when ￿ is elastic
with respect to the length of the work permit and declines when it is inelastic.
Change in preferences of S
An increase in the weight ￿
￿ of ￿scal expenditures relative to that of
repatriated savings in the objective function of the source country shifts
RF* down while leaving RF una⁄ected. The comparative statics results are
therefore the opposite of those reported in the case of an increase in w0: A
16rise in ￿
￿ lowers B and either increases or lowers ￿, depending on whether ￿￿
is smaller or larger than unity.
(24) ￿ d￿
d￿￿ = B￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 + ￿B)1￿￿
B ￿B ? 0; as ￿￿ 7 1;
(25) ￿ dB
d￿￿ = [￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿]B(1 + ￿B) < 0:
The result concerning ￿ re￿ ects the need for the host country to step
up its e⁄orts to confront illegal immigration by adjusting ￿ when the source
country lowers the ￿scal bene￿ts o⁄ered to returnees. A reduction in the
stock of illegal immigrants generated per employment position is achieved by
increasing ￿ when ￿￿ < 1 and by lowering ￿ when ￿￿ > 1.
Change in preferences of H
We ￿nally consider the implications of an increase in the perceived cost
of illegal immigration in the host country. With an increase in ￿, the host
country will try to reduce the number of overstayers over any given time
horizon by raising (lowering) ￿ when ￿￿ < 1 (￿￿ > 1) for any given B. In
the case corresponding to ￿gure 1a, this shifts the RF schedule to the right,
while in the case depicted in ￿gure 1b, it shifts it to the left. It follows that
both ￿ and B increase when ￿￿ < 1 and they both decline when ￿￿ > 1:
(26) ￿d￿
d￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿(1 + ￿B) ? 0; as ￿￿ 7 1;
(27) ￿dB
d￿ = (w0 + ￿￿)￿B￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) ? 0; as ￿￿ 7 1:
In each case, the change in B re￿ ects the induced e⁄ect of policy adjust-
ment in H on the incentive of S to alter the ￿scal bene￿ts o⁄ered to returnees.
The bene￿ts are increased when ￿ is extended and reduced with a cut in ￿:
Our ￿ndings can be summarized in the following proposition.
17Proposition 1: Assume that country H chooses ￿ and country S chooses
B to maximize, respectively, its own welfare (i.e., Nash behavior).
- The Nash equilibrium level of ￿
a) increases with an increase in C;
b) increases with an increase (decrease) in w0 if ￿￿ > 1 (￿￿ < 1);
c) increases with an increase (decrease) in ￿ and ￿
￿ if ￿￿ < 1 (￿￿ > 1);
d) increases with a decrease in ￿ if ￿￿ < 1 but may decrease if ￿￿ > 1.
- The Nash equilibrium level of B
a) increases with an increase in C, w0 and with a decrease in ￿
￿;
b) increases with an increase (decrease) in ￿ if ￿￿ < 1 (￿￿ > 1);
c) increases with a decrease in ￿ if ￿￿ < 1 but may decrease if ￿￿ > 1:
For example, if ￿￿ < 1; the Nash equilibrium maximum duration ￿ of
a guest-worker permit increases with an increase in C, ￿;￿
￿; and with a
decrease in !0 and ￿. Under the same condition, the Nash equlibrium
bene￿t B o⁄ered to returnees increases with an increase in C, !0; ￿; ￿
￿ and
with a decrease in ￿:
4 Cooperative Equilibrium
Assume now that both countries are interested in maximizing their joint
welfare. That is, the host country chooses the level of ￿ that maximizes
world welfare W = V + V ￿, while the source country tries to do the same
when choosing B. In doing so, the source country sets the value of B such
that
18(28) WB = VB + V ￿
B = 0;
From eq.(6), and taking into account that ￿ is now a function of both ￿
and B; we note that the level of welfare of the host country is an increasing
function of B.
(29) VB = ￿T
￿ ￿￿B > 0:
This is because more generous bene￿ts received by returning migrants in
S reduce illegal immigration in H. Since VB is always positive, we conclude
on the basis of (28) that at the Nash equilibrium, where V ￿
B = 0; the value of
WB is also positive. The cooperative level of B, call it BC, that maximizes
the joint level of welfare, is therefore higher than its Nash level, BN. This
can be seen with the help of ￿gure 3. When B = BN; the slope of V ￿ is zero,
while VB is positive. That means that the slope of W at B = BN is also
positive and the maximum of W is achieved at a higher level of B = BC:
Similarly, the host country chooses the level of ￿ to maximize its own and
the source country￿ s welfare. This requires that
(30) W￿ = V￿ + V ￿
￿ = 0
Di⁄erentiating eq.(9) with respect to ￿ and using the condition that V ￿
B =
0 at the Nash equilibrium, we get
(31) V ￿






From eq.(31), we see that a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for V ￿
￿
(and thus W￿) to be positive at the Nash equilibrium is that
(32) (1 ￿ ￿)￿B > ￿￿￿:
If this condition is satis￿ed, the level of ￿ that maximizes the joint level
of welfare (i.e., the cooperative solution ￿C) is higher than its Nash value,
￿N. Condition (32) requires that the ratio of the elasticity of the probability
of return with respect to B to the probability of overstaying with respect to
19￿ be higher than ￿
1￿￿: The relative magnitudes of these two elasticities is an
empirical question which is beyond the scope of the present study. What we
can say is that the cooperative solution for ￿ is larger, the greater the value
of ￿B relative to ￿￿ and the smaller the value of ￿ at the Nash equilibrium.
In other words, the greater the e⁄ectiveness of B relative to ￿ in promoting
return of guest workers back to the source country, the larger the value of
￿ in the cooperative equilibrium when compared to Nash. This re￿ ects the
tendency of policymakers to rely more heavily on B and less on ￿ as an
instrument aimed at combating illegal immigration in a cooperative setting
when the former instrument is relatively more e¢ cient.
It is also interesting to note that maximization of joint welfare in a co-
operative equilibrium may not result in an improvement in welfare of both
countries relative to Nash. As demonstrated above, the cooperative value of
￿ may be either greater or smaller than its Nash level. Consider the border-
line case where ￿C=￿N. Since BC > BN; it follows that cooperation raises
the joint level of welfare and that of the host country, while lowering the
level of welfare of the source country. This is because cooperation requires
S to raise B beyond the value that maximizes its own welfare while in the
borderline case, it does not call for any change in ￿ that can potentially o⁄est
the loss experienced by S as it raises B from BN to BC: This illustrates that
acheving cooperation may require side payments as an inducement for the
source country to set its policy instrument at a value that maximizes joint
welfare.
We summarize our ￿ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Assume that country H chooses ￿ and country S chooses
B to maximize the joint level of welfare (i.e., cooperative behavior).
- The cooperative level of B is higher than the Nash level.




(su¢ cient but not necessary).
- Cooperation may lower the welfare of the source country, implying that
a side payment may be necessary to induce it to raise the value of B from
BN to BC:
205 Conclusions
This paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host
and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For
the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while
also addressing the problem of illegal immigration. It optimizes over these
objectives by setting the maximum duration, ￿, of a guest-worker permit. As
for the source country, we assume that it wants to stimulate the ￿ ow of repa-
triated savings of migrants by o⁄ering ￿scal bene￿ts and other advantages,
B, to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium
and analyse the implications of changes in the exogenous variables for the
optimal levels of policy instruments of both countries.
The possibility of international cooperation is also examined assuming
that the two countries wish to maximize joint welfare. In comparison with
the Nash equilibrium, our results are not as clear cut. Nonetheless, we
￿nd that the ￿scal bene￿ts o⁄ered to returnees by the source country are
unambiguously higher in a cooperative equilibrium. The optimal value of
￿ in the cooperative equilibrium is also likely to be greater than its Nash
level, although a smaller ￿ cannot be ruled out for certain parameter values.
What we can say is that the greater the e⁄ectiveness of B relative to ￿ in
encouraging guest workers to return to the source country, the larger the
value of ￿ in a cooperative equilibrium when compared to its Nash level.
Cooperation, however, may result in a decline in the level of welfare of the
source country. To achieve cooperation and get the source country to raise
the value of its policy instrument to the cooperative level, it may be necessary
for the host country to o⁄er a side payment.
In comparison with other dimensions of international economic relations,
there seems to be at the present time too little international cooperation when
it comes to policies that a⁄ect migartion of labor. Immigration policies are
often set unilaterally, without adequate consideration given to the interests
of the source countries. This has contributed to the rapid growth of illegal
immigration and the disorder that it generates in the labor market of the
host country as well as in the lives of the migrants. As shown above, it may
also result in an ine¢ cient use of policy instruments in both the host and
source countries. There is clearly scope for ￿nding superior solutions through
21international cooperation in those areas where both the sending and receiving
countries have key interests. Bilateral agreements on temporary migration of
low-skilled labor between Canada and Mexico, Canada and Caribbean states
or Spain and Ecuador are steps in the right direction. More are needed. The
main objective of this paper is to stimulate interest in and further research
on this increasingly important issue.
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